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Abstract:     
Southern Africa is probably the most unevenly developed region on earth, combining the 
most modern technologies and an advanced working class with the world’s extremes of 
inequality and social militancy. The two most extreme countries, both with settler–colonial 
populations and accumulation processes that created durable class/race/gender distortions 
and extreme environmental degradation, are South Africa and  Zimbabwe—both  of  which  
Neil  Smith  visited  in  1995.  His contribution to our understanding of political economy, 
before and after, was exemplary. We consider in this article how Smith’s theory assisted in the 
understanding of crisis-ridden financial markets within the framework of capital 
overaccumulation and intensified spatial unevenness; the politics of scale, difference and 
community; and the ways that class apartheid and durable racism in the two countries 
together fit within contemporary geopolitical economy. 
 
Introduction 
Southern Africa was an ideal site for Neil Smith to visit, if even just once. In 1995, he was in both 
South Africa (when Durban hosted the International  Geographical Union) and Zimbabwe  (the  
Bvumba  mountains  straddling  Mozambique,  where he illegally jumped a mine-infested border 
trail on  a  bird-watching  quest). Periodically from the early 1980s until his death, he 
encouraged our application of the core Marxist ideas about uneven development here. Those 
ideas affected our research and contestation of financial markets (Bond), urban processes and 
regional dynamics (Ruiters) and geopolitical strategy (both of us), in a context of durable yet 
ever-shifting class–race–gender oppressions and environmental degradations. The most 
important theoretical contributions from Smith come from his earlier works, which we have 
drawn upon most in the pages that follow. 
 
We knew Smith personally thanks to doctoral studies in geography at Johns Hopkins University 
in the 1980s–1990s and occasional suppers at David Harvey’s Baltimore residence. What we 
permanently value from Smith’s remarkably hard-line yet also nuanced revolutionary 
Marxist project, is not only the unstinting conviction for which he was world famous, 
but a sense that without the rigour, creativity and eloquence he epitomised, we are all 





Southern Africa  is the last place, however, one would  expect  to ghettoise historical 
geographical materialism given how many attempts there have been at neo-Marxist (albeit 
sometimes un-Marxist) political-economic theorisation (Bond and Desai 2006). Until the 
last decade’s attempts by the likes of Samantha Ashman, Richard Ballard, Sharad Chari, 
Ashwin Desai, Ben Fine, Gill Hart, Susan Newman, Melanie Samson, Trevor Ngwane and 
ourselves, no one here tried to pull together the perspective on uneven development Smith 
pointed to from 1984 onwards. No one here properly specified the structured character of 
divergences in production, reproduction and society–nature relations under global 
capitalism, in spite of Southern Africa being the most unevenly developed region on earth. 
 
Smith warned that uneven development in capitalism is “structural not statistical” (Smith 
1990:xiii). Still, some simple data offer a starting point that makes this abundantly evident 
(Bond 2014): 
 
 Gini income inequality coefficients for South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho and Namibia 
are the world’s four highest, with South Africa’s measured by the World Bank at 0.77. 
 In polls (of business leaders) regarding worker militancy within national working 
classes, those in South Africa and Angola are, respectively, the least and the fourth least 
cooperative, according to the World Economic Forum. 
 South Africa can boast amongst the highest levels of protests (counted by police 
reports) per person in the world that we know of (nearly 2300 ended in violence in Bond 
2014). 
 From the top down, Johannesburg hosts the most  corrupt  capitalist class anywhere 
(as measured by PricewaterhouseCoopers), with its settler– colonial cultural forms and 
brutal orientation to accumulation through extractive dispossession. 
 The region suffers life-long political leaders whose patronage-based rule is tied to 
crony capitalism in Swaziland (Africa’s last feudal monarchy under King Mswati), 
Zimbabwe (where Robert Mugabe persists at age 91, in his 35th year in power, as we 
write), Angola (the most extreme kleptocracy, where José Eduardo dos Santos has ruled 
since 1979) and the war-torn Democratic Republic of the Congo (a Kabila family kingdom 
following Mobutu’s 1965–1997 dictatorship). 
 
Finally, some of the most important ideological and strategic lessons we learned from Smith, 
once a leader in a small revolutionary political party, are urgently needed in our politically 
turbulent region. Smith had what (he often confessed) was a formulaic approach to 
Trotskyism during the 1980s but his departure from the fold due to a dispute over whether 
feminist socialists should have the space to organise a caucus within the International 
Socialism tradition, showed how genuinely concerned he was to avoid the most rigid kind 
of vanguardist Leninist party in search of something more appropriate to the context. 
 
That openness is the sensibility required to penetrate the politics of uneven development 
in Southern Africa at a conjuncture in which Smith would, as do we, celebrate the 




oppressed: poor and working-class people, women, youth, the elderly, the LGBTI 
community, and environmentalists. But it is in making the new that the challenges  arise—
especially  resurgent  xenophobia  amongst the lowest income urban residents—and here, 
Smith’s ideas about uneven development inform our own sense of capitalism’s limits. Indeed 
it is in the depraved character of capitalist crisis, Smith would agree, that amplified uneven 
development and financialisation are most obvious. In turn, the most grounded 
revolutionary strategies must now consciously link class, race and scale politics. 
 
Uneven Zimbabwe and South Africa (Patrick Bond) 
My first mentor was, in retrospect, not hard to find. It was a moment of considerable 
frustration, in the society and for me personally, immersed as I was in classical guitar studies 
during winter–spring 1982. The season was a cold one for the left, as Reaganism 
gathered pace. Warmed considerably at the Johns Hopkins University Grad Club, which 
Smith had established for conviviality’s sake—so necessary at that staid institution—there was 
an unending series of informal seminars on Marxism. Thanks to Smith, I found myself 
shaking off the musty tradition of Kennedy liberalism along with my training in neoclassical 
economics received up the highway at Swarthmore College. My junior-year semester sojourn 
was at the Peabody Conservatory, a few miles down Charles Street from the Hopkins 
Homewood Campus protests, pubs and polemics where Smith was a constant presence. More 
than any period, those were the formative weeks for my personal politics. I had not met David 
Harvey at that stage. But after many hours learning from Smith and his mates, and nearly 
joining the International Socialist Organisation under his tutelage, I drifted back to finish 
my BA Economics in Philadelphia. After graduation and a (repay-the-student-debt) job at 
the Federal Reserve augmented by finance studies with Edward Herman at the Wharton 
School, by 1985 it was time to move on. I took very seriously Smith’s suggestion that I 
start my PhD with Harvey, a stroke of great luck. Smith’s life-changing advice is 
something that so many others can also testify to. 
 
He made one vital intervention as I thought through research topics for the doctorate. 
Smith remarked on how much theoretical work on capital’s spatial, sectoral and scalar 
unevenness was now accomplished, what with Limits to Capital placing these matters so 
centrally within political economy. The era of globalised financialisation was gaining 
unstoppable momentum, and Smith motivated an empirical study of the phenomenon 
using a particular place that was comprehensible as a country unit within a fast-changing 
world context: the uneven development of Zimbabwe. 
 
That led to my permanent move to Southern Africa in 1989 where over the past quarter 
century, Smith’s ideas came to serve with a force as great only as Harvey’s. Since then, I have 
spent most of my time cataloguing the unevenness of neoliberal public policy, capital 
accumulation and social struggles in Zimbabwe and South Africa. Zimbabwe was especially 
important because a century of colonial power could be traced, from 1890 to 1990, with a 
national specificity rare in doctoral case studies. There were, of course, both imported and 




tosettler–colonial economic interests. For these reasons, Smith’s work has been vital to my 
analysis, and grows ever more so the more capitalism teeters. 
 
The core transferable insight from Smith (1990:149), in my view, is that uneven 
development represents “the geographical contradiction between development and 
underdevelopment where the overaccumulation of capital at one pole is matched by the 
overaccumulation of labour at the other”. Drawing upon Harvey’s (1982) Limits to Capital 
framing, there are two core dynamics of a geographical nature here. First, the fulcrum of 
geographical unevenness is the differentiated return on investment that creation and/or 
destruction of entire built environments—and the social structures that accompany them—
offer to different kinds of investors with different time horizons. Meanwhile, different places 
compete endlessly with one another to attract investment and in the process they tend to 
amplify unevenness, allowing capital to play one local or regional or national class 
configuration off against others. The territorial power blocs that emerge are the subject of 
geopolitical analysis, in a formulation that works well at various scales. Understanding the 
defence of territory against devalorisation of overaccumulated capital helps identify 
causality in geopolitics. 
 
Smith’s (1998) later argument stressed the continual, if never permanent, resolution of 
opposing tendencies toward the geographical equalisation and differentiation of the 
conditions and levels of production. The search for a spatial fix is continually frustrated, 
never realised, creating distinct patterns of geographical unevenness through the continued 
see-saw of capital. How well does Smith’s sense of see-saw unevenness relate to societies 
where capitalist and non-capitalist relations are in such constant tension as in this 
region? Others within the Western Marxist tradition had already noted capitalism’s 
unevenness in Africa (Arrighi and Saul 1973). But after noting the obvious, few investigated 
the dynamic underlying it. 
 
One was Ian Phimister (1992), who telescoped out to the global scale at the critical 
moment in the colonial-capitalist era, the late 19th century. The Scramble for Africa was 
codified in the 1885 Berlin Conference continent-carving of borders, an outcome of 
overaccumulation, financialisation and shifting geopolitical power that ebbed and flowed 
according to both metropol and settler–colonial relations. Reflecting Smith’s mode of 
argument, Phimister (1992:1) showed how the Scramble occurred because of “capitalism’s 
markedly uneven development” which led “France, and to a lesser extent, Britain, to 
embark on programmes of colonial expansion. British intervention, however, invariably 
reactive and reluctant, was crucially shaped by City interests encapsulated in the policy 
of Free Trade”. 
 
The organisation of this region’s capitalist space by settler–colonial regimes intensified 
following the discovery of diamonds (1860s in Kimberley) and gold (1880s in the 
Witwatersrand area better known as Johannesburg). From the 1890s, the anticipated 
gold finds in Zimbabwe led to a similar settler–capitalist invasion, one described by 




nature of economic and political development”. Overestimating the potential for gold finds 
near what are now the country’s second and third largest cities (Bulawayo and Masvingo) 
meant that Cecil Rhodes had to recoup  his  railroad  and  telegraph  infrastructure  
expenditures  by  importing more than 20,000 English settlers with the promise of free 
land and a future in farming—with all that this entailed for displacement and 
dispossession. Rhodes, who gained his fortune consolidating the diamond industry by 
hook or by crook in the 1870s–1880s, had completely missed the mid-1880s gold finds 
that made Johannesburg Africa’s richest city. This made him more desperate to find the next 
seam, taking the unprofitable risk with the British South Africa Company invasion of 
Zimbabwe. 
 
But as Arnold Sibanda (1990) then showed, it was not Rhodes’ mistake, but the 
inexorability of mining capital’s imposition of wage relations—formal capitalism—that 
would cement its extreme uneven development. I recall Smith agreeing with this bigger-
picture argument, stressing the necessity of capital’s outreach rather than the 
contingency—no matter how compelling a personal story—of Rhodes’ outsized ego. (That 
ego, in turn, meant the University of Cape Town, received its original bequest from Rhodes’ 
ill-begotten fortune, but in 2015, his dominating statue there briefly became the national 
focal point for #RhodesMustFall activism—which began with a black student hurling a 
bucket of excrement on Rhodes and ended a month later with the statue’s eviction—thus 
symbolising how little of the “elite transition” had trickled down even at the country’s main 
tertiary education site of elite reproduction.) 
 
How was this unevenness expressed in terms of the space economy of production 
relations? In South Africa, the phenomenon of apartheid-era unevenness was considered a 
case of “articulations of modes of production”, as the exiled lawyer-sociologist Harold 
Wolpe (1980) theorised in the early 1970s, based on Claude Meillassoux’s (1975) study of 
articulations between capitalist and non-capitalist relations of agricultural production in 
the Ivory  Coast. Smith (1990:156), however, explained it in more abstract theoretical 
terms: 
 
The logic of uneven development is theoretically prior to the problematic of articulation of 
modes of production. The point is that today the “articulation of modes of production” is a 
product of the developments and limits of capital, not vice versa. More concretely, it is the 
logic of uneven development which structures the context for this articulation. 
 
The settler–colonial and minerals-based power of those who a c c u m u l a t e d  most capital 
in the period prior to national independence—Zimbabwe in 1980, South Africa in 1994—
led to such structured unevenness, that the phenomenon was not reversed after liberation 
but instead amplified when conjoined with neoliberalism. Indeed, Smith’s ideas were vital to 
us understanding the process by which capital worked through the inherited spatial form 
and abused it further, for example, after 1994 in the extension of migrant labour for 
South Africa’s new platinum mines and lowering of prevailing wage rates; ubiquitous 




gentrification in Cape Town and Johannesburg); and perhaps most importantly, the 
region’s deepened insertion into a world system intent on debt peonage, reversion to 
primary commodity export orientation and the deindustrialisation of manufacturing. 
 
Finance was central to both the neoliberal policy regime and to the amplification of 
unevenness. Both Harvey and Smith showed how, theoretically, the tendency to 
overaccumulation crisis affects capital’s search for geographical differentiation and how 
space then becomes a much more crucial means of production (Smith 1990:85–87). As 
overaccumulation sets in, productive investment meets gluts and is redirected into 
financial circuits. In turn, the public policy of finance remains state neoliberalism, and in 
both Zimbabwe and South Africa this policy frame was utterly dominant over the past 
quarter century (Bond 1998, 2014). It was a despairing time, with no obvious countervailing 
forces on the horizon aside from internal capitalist contradictions. 
 
All this we agreed on. However, there was not a complete overlap in our perspectives, 
notwithstanding common roots. As one example, the relationship between finance and 
uneven spatial development was, at least initially, inadequately conceptualised by Smith 
(1990:150). He situated the origins of uneven development in “the constant necessary 
movement from fixed to circulating capital and back to fixed. At an even more basic level, it is 
the geographical manifestation of the equally constant and necessary movement from use-
value to exchange-value and back to use-value”. 
 
But because the movement from exchange-value to use-value and back depends on money as a 
medium of exchange and store of value, with credit amplifying these roles, the dynamism of 
uneven development relates at least to some degree to the exercise of financial power, a point 
Smith observed empirically with anecdotes in his Uneven Development, but one he simply 
neglected to theorise (as Arrighi [1994] did later, for example, in The Long Twentieth Century). 
During the prior century’s epoch of imperialism, entire currency blocs battled each other for 
trading dominance. This sort of totalising process was one through which finance seemed to 
level local dynamics of uneven development, in the course of imposing similar conditions 
drawing closer the various  components  of  the  global  space  economy into a universal law of 
value. 
 
But in this respect, scale differentiation proved a vital ingredient in understanding 
unevenness over time in a case study site like Southern Africa. Again, we have Smith (1990:134) 
to thank for this insight, for scale is a “crucial window on the uneven development of 
capital, because it is difficult to comprehend the real meaning of ‘dispersal’, 
‘decentralisation’, ‘spatial restructuring’ and so forth, without a clear understanding of 
geographical scale”. 
 
Thinking this through during my own study of Zimbabwe’s financial deepening and 
periodic crisis formation over the course of a century, it became evident that power 
established and exercised at the highest scales was also subject to challenge and then to 




development of scale” meant that at some points in time— the 1930s–1940s and 1960s–
1970s most obviously—there was much greater national determination (what is today 
termed “policy space”) while at other points (the 1920s and 1980s–1990s) an overarching 
logic of global capital came to bear, and scale power shifted to world financial circuitries 
(Bond 1998). Again, it is interesting to assess minor disagreements, for Smith, relying on 
production-bound understandings of scale derived from the division of labour, 
apparently considered the uneven power of finance at different scales a contingent (and 
relatively unimportant) feature of capitalist development. My objective, in contrast, was 
to theorise it as a function of the tendency to overaccumulate in the productive sector, 
switching capital into the financial sector, and then in the process discovering vital policy 
power shifts from national to global sites. Instead, for Smith (1990:123), the key to uneven 
development was the changing basis of the centralisation and dispersal of productive capital 
across international, national and urban scales: “Certainly the spatial centralisation of 
money capital can be considerably enhanced by the centralisation of social capital as a whole, 
but in itself the spatial centralisation of money capital is of little significance”. To make his 
case, Smith originally (his 1982 thesis) referred to the accommodating role and lubricating 
function of finance within capitalism, not factoring in the power of finance to remake 
economic policy. 
 
But as overaccumulation becomes generalised and financial power rises, the spatial 
centralisation of money capital (e.g. in the 1970s from petroleum consumers to the New 
York bank accounts of Arab rulers) is typically the proximate catalyst and facilitator for the 
subsequent amplification of uneven development. During the 1970s, the flood of 
Petrodollars to Third World dictators was a central cause in the restructuring of the 
international division of labour and dependency relations of peripheral regions, especially 
once the Debt Crisis broke in 1982 when Mexico defaulted. After all, in contemporary times 
the main way in which spatially centralised financial power is experienced is through the 
determination of national-level policies by the Washington, DC-based international financial 
institutions acting on behalf of the commercial and investment banks. By the time of the 
1990 edition of Uneven Development, Smith delighted in recounting the view of Wall Street’s 
Thomas Johnson, describing the contradictions behind the power of world finance over the 
Third World: “There is a possibility of a nightmarish domino effect, as every creditor 
ransacks the globe attempting to locate his collateral” (Smith 1990:161). 
 
In other respects, Smith understood the determination of scale not by productive relations 
but by financial power. Uneven development of the built environment at the urban scale, for 
example, intensifies principally because the land rent structure becomes one in a set of 
portfolio options for financiers. Smith (1990:148) confirmed: “To the extent that ground 
rent becomes an expression of the interest rate with the historical development of capital, 
the ground rent structure is tied to the determination of value in the system as a whole”. 
Rent as an integrative lever—in this case, a means of universalising capitalist space 
relations—is hence integrated into the broader capitalist economy by another lever of 




which the most important are the demand for money and the concomitant balance of 
power relations between creditors and debtors of various sorts. 
 
The financial accentuation of an underlying boom-bust phenomenon is what Smith and I 
discussed when we occasionally met during the 1990s, as I sought clarity on Zimbabwe’s 
uneven socio-spatial structure. As Phimister was most effective in proving at the outset of 
settler colonialism’s birth, the power of finance profoundly affected the subsequent 
articulation of capitalist and pre-capitalist modes of production, generating the basis for 
disarticulated development. And much earlier, drawing upon secondary research material 
from South Africa, Namibia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rosa Luxemburg’s 
1913 text Accumulation of Capital has very similar insights about overaccumulation, financial 
bubbling and extreme tendencies towards accumulation by dispossession (Luxemburg 
1968). Smith’s argument that the logic of uneven development (at the global scale) is 
“prior to the problematic of articulation of modes of production” helps put these insights 
into perspective. 
 
The Politics of Uneven Development, Scale, Difference, Strategy, and 
Agency (Greg Ruiters) 
“Uneven development … thy name is war”, wrote Smith (1990:154). He implored us to 
connect with a “political treatment of uneven development”. What were the kinds of 
politico-strategic questions and silences that propelled Smith to develop a theory of the 
construction and politics of scale? And, how might this inform applying his theory of 
uneven development and scale to collective action and political solidarity, given the vast 
differences among poor and working people across the globe and on the African continent? 
 
Smith’s work on spatialised politics is increasingly relevant in the context of extremely 
serious challenges (localism, fragmentation, public space, land dispossession or 
homelessness, gated communities, migration and devastating xenophobia against black 
foreign nationals in South Africa) facing social and political movements in Southern 
Africa and beyond. It is also relevant in the context of the sustained scholarly bias against 
thoroughly incorporating space in theories of social change, social movements and social 
theory more generally. 
 
Smith insisted that we need to be fully aware that scale defines our politics, our loyalties and 
the place where we stand. Trained in a Marxist-Trotskyist approach, Smith’s work might be 
seen as an extended conversation with Trotsky (1977) and further refutation of crude forms 
of mechanical marxism such as is found in Stalinism. Hence, he argues, our spatial ideologies 
are fundamental to what makes politics progressive (Smith 1990:172–175; Smith 1992). 
Capital organises uneven development at various scales (Smith 1990:136) with national 
and urban scales acting as the main forms of organising accumulation and difference, 
and the international scale pre-eminently driven by the tendency to equalisation (Smith 
1990:139). Capitalism “produces real spatial scales which give uneven development its 
coherence” (Smith 1990: xv). National borders, passports, xenophobic and racist attacks 




various material dimensions of how the bourgeoisie institutionally territorialises and carves 
up the world. 
 
We owe a great debt to Smith for further developing a conceptual vocabulary for exploring 
scale by defining specific scales: the body, home, community, urban, region, nation, global 
and by identifying four dimensions for each scale. The latter were (1) what are the  features  
that render each  scale  coherent;  (2) internal differences within scales; (3) borders with 
other scales; and (4) political possibilities for resistance inherent in the production of 
specific scales, the abrogation of boundaries, the “jumping of scales”. 
 
Simply put, “scale” determines how we formulate problems, and implicit in such 
formulations is how we attribute causes to problems and how we look for solutions. 
Feminists working at the scale of the body/personal have long argued that the personal is 
also public-political. By redefining the scale of issues, feminists have succeeded in 
presenting radically new insights and strategies for overcoming oppression. How we think 
about, act and try to solve problems is critical in who is part of the solution. Smith in many 
ways takes up where Marx left off. Marx offered strong scalar arguments with his 
formulation that “workers have no country” and that capital was global from the 
beginning (also see Harvey’s recounting of globalisation as formulated in the 
Communist Manifesto). But for Marx scale also defined the communist vision—scale was a 
political project. 
 
Avoiding the rigid separation of spatial scales, Smith insisted that these were nested 
spheres of social activity that were not hierarchical (Smith 1992:66). Nesting of scales 
requires human agency and plays out in very different ways in different places for different 
social groups and it is implied that there is no one way traffic from the local to global and 
vice versa. But this kind of question can only be dealt with empirically in concrete situations. 
Racism might be “nested” at various scales in different contexts as a “minority issue” of a 
black community to be resolved at local levels or as a majority issue of national dimensions. 
 
“Racism”, Smith argued, “is every bit a global construct of the financial markets and cultural 
privilege, encapsulated in the reality of the ‘third world’”. Smith (1993:105) suggests: 
 
the community is properly conceived as the site of social reproduction, but the activities 
involved in social reproduction are so pervasive that the identity and spatial boundaries of 
community are often indistinct … Community is therefore the least defined of spatial scales, 
and the consequent vague yet generally affirmative nurturing meaning attached to 
“community” makes it one of the most ideologically appropriated metaphors in 
contemporary public discourse. 
 
At the community scale, Smith supported the broadening of the black power movement 





Afro-Caribbeans and many Asians began to call themselves “black,” in a clear act of 
solidarity expressing their own experience of racism. Despite opposition from whites, who 
feared the consequent racial unity, the broadened label stuck … the scale of black identity 
was thereby expanded (Smith 1992:71). 
 
With strong echoes of Biko and Fanon, and like Trotsky who argued in the 1930s that the 
“black republic” slogan in South Africa was a fundamental issue even though it had no 
apparent “class content”, Smith promoted a non-reductionist form of Marxism. Trotsky 
had argued (in a mode that even Biko or Fanon might have accepted) that white workers 
could never act as class-conscious fighters until they shed their racism against black workers 
(see Drew 1996:149 for Trotsky’s 1934 letter). Shocking his South African workerist 
supporters, Trotsky vehemently put the race/native question as the determinant class 
question arguing that we cannot make even the “smallest concession to the privileges and 
prejudices of the white workers” (quoted in Drew 1996:150). Hence, race was not merely a 
supplementary feature of South Africa’s capitalism, but fundamental. 
 
I strongly suspect that Smith’s support for the cogency of the idea of “black community” 
drew on this kind of non-dogmatic Marxism. Yet Smith might agree that blacks might not 
want to be seen as belonging to “affective communities” where whites are seen as free-
floating rational persons. The black person projected as member of a black community is a 
double edged sword since the term black community is used by neoliberals as an external 
projection of white power (see Harvey 1996:352 for a brilliant critique of identity 
politics). The important point to stress is the “relationality” of scales, where the socially 
constructed interconnections between scales provide a pivot for up-scaling. 
 
Smith went on to argue that social life in general cannot be understood from a singular scalar 
view, and different abstractions (race, gender, class) and forces are constructed at different 
scales with very different and contradictory political projects. Smith (like Harvey) remained 
wary of the fetishism of the local scale of community identity. Hence he aphoristically wrote: 
“the conquest of scale is the central political goal” (Smith 2002:205). For Harvey (1996:325) 
there is an ugly side to place-based politics found in a number of forms (notions of organic 
face-to-face communities, xenophobia, racism and bourgeois exclusionary communitarianism). 
Smith argued for a “critical internationalism”, insisting that although “capital might for now 
make the world in its own image, it does not control the global or any other scale”. The 
bourgeoisie are able to command global space unlike locally contained social movements of the 
poor and the working class. The question of scale was simultaneously a methodological, 
political and organisational one. 
 
Harvey (1989) uses the terms community and neighbourhood, grounding them in the 
production of class strata and as part of residential differentiation based on reproducing certain 
gradations of labour power. Our sense of our place (be it the household, townships, suburbs 





South Africa uniquely has the strongest trade unions in Africa and among the most 
militant in the global South (Silver 2013; World Economic Forum 2015). The problem is 
that although “upscaling” and broadening solidarities and identities is posited as a desirable 
goal for social movements, Smith remains tantalisingly vague on the organisational 
methods, coalitions and modalities and agencies for such upscaling. 
 
For example, Smith does not appear to have sufficiently explored scalar debates around the 
site of production versus the site of reproduction/community (an important theme in the 
history of South Africa’s progressive trade unions, where during the 1980s 
workerists/syndicalists clashed with community-based nationalists and the Black 
Consciousness movement). Harvey (1996:22–23) explored the limits of factory politics 
versus community politics, concluding that for genuine class solidarity to occur, 
abstraction from the immediacy of place and actual people was essential. The successes and 
failures of scalar ideologies in South African populism, workerism, the Black 
Consciousness movement and PanAfricanism might also be usefully engaged using 
Smith’s theory combined with Harvey’s insights. Smith’s later work on national scale would 
also have benefitted from more engagement with progressive nationalists, anti-colonial 
movements and issues around national self-determination and the national public  sphere,  
e.g.  his later discussion on the public sphere as essentially an urban scale phenomenon 
(Low and Smith 2006:3). 
 
Most urgently, still, the “national question” continues to raise analytical problems of 
decolonisation and neo-colonialism, self-determination of a people and territorial 
sovereignty. In South Africa, struggles for de-colonisation, to create a new South African 
nation are at the heart of contemporary uprisings. The importance of national politics of 
the black public sphere became an area of interest in Smith’s book co-edited with Setha Low 
(Low and Smith 2006). Likewise, Thandika Mkandawire (2009) argues: 
 
the national question has always been closely associated with the history of oppressed or 
colonised peoples. For much of the twentieth century, the national question involved first, 
simply asserting one’s humanity or the presence africaine … second, the acquisition of 
independence, and third, maintaining the unity and territorial integrity of the new state. 
 
Fanon’s critique of the pitfalls of (bourgeois) national consciousness was premised on an 
alternative standpoint, but is still located within a nationalist frame. The issue at stake was 
what combination of class forces would lead the nationalist struggle? 
 
Uneven Development, Scale, and Spatio-Temporal Politics 
Marx argued that with the rise of capitalism, “in place of the old local and national seclusion 
and self-sufficiency, we have intercourse in every direction, universal interdependence of 
nations …”. (Marx and Engels 2012:39). In his 1906 book Results and Prospects, Trotsky 
(2005) emphasised deepening interdependence between countries and urban centres, given 




the leveling of world economy is upset by it even more violently and convulsively than in the 
preceding epochs”. 
 
Smith’s idea of nested scales emphasises the interdependence of these political-economic 
processes. More difficult to work out is the relative balance of equalisation/levelling and 
differentiation. Along these lines, Smith issued a number of caveats about uneven 
development: first, many tend to neglect equalisation as an aspect of uneven development 
(Smith 1990:xii) preferring to look at only differences (inequality, etc.). Yet, equalisation, 
as Smith argues, is the overriding imperative of working class politics and indeed its 
“political future lies in the equalisation of conditions and levels of development of 
production … laying the basis for socialism” (Smith 1990:153). 
 
On the other hand, Marx might have overemphasised capital’s levelling and 
universalising tendencies, argued Smith (1990:94–95), and while not oblivious to 
differentiation, he saw the former as primary. In retrospect Marx’s prediction that India 
would equalise if not overtake Britain rings more true even though this development 
has taken much longer than Marx anticipated. Smith used the awkward and somewhat 
mechanical metaphor of a see-saw to describe the “development of underdevelopment”, 
arguing that this is central to uneven development at the urban scale as well as globally. He 
believed (wrongly if Arrighi [2009] is right) that the basic global pattern of development 
centred on US dominance and that underdevelopment in the periphery would remain 
constant with perhaps only a “handful of so-called newly industrialising countries” 
emerging to disrupt that pattern (Smith 1990:151–158). 
 
What then can we learn from Smith’s method about understanding complex changes 
that drive the production of difference and implications for solidarity within the broad 
working class? And secondly, what levers might be built to “jump scales”—a difficult task 
that involves talking across scales, understanding differences, and building organised 
coalitions and united fronts between sections of the class in different places and countries 
(see Ashman et al. 2010; Ashman and Pons-Vignon 2014; Bond et al. 2013; Ruiters 2014). 
 
Differences across national capitalisms (or the scale of the nation state) might be dismissed as 
epiphenomena, mere “warts on the face” of capitalism. Similarity of neoliberal conditions 
across the global working class (regional or international) in this view is what makes 
international working class action more possible. This, however, is a doubly flawed idea, 
and one that does not consistently link to a Marxist methodology. What makes common 
politics possible and concrete is an understanding of the real peculiarities (or 
“recombinations of places and events”, as Smith 1990:ix called it). Moreover, Smith earlier 
had grasped that differentiation is not an epiphenomenon but is rooted in sites including 
the household and the bodily scales (Marston and Smith 2001). 
 
Where Smith wrote of “differentiation and equalisation”, Trotsky used the formulation 
“combined development” which refers to the multifarious ways  in which spaces and 




“leapfrogging” intermediate stages of development under the “whip of competition” seems 
crucial in understanding why some places might be more volatile than others. 
 
The importance of context and specificity of time and space in both Trotsky and Smith 
cannot be overstated. Similarly, as noted by Smith it is not about the abstract primacy of class 
but in different places, gender or race could be the decisive issue for that working class as 
combined and novel social forms take root. To illustrate, Smith’s (1990:174) own writings 
on Lower Manhattan’s Tomkins Square Park conflict suggest that progressive and 
potentially revolutionary struggles can start anywhere at any scale. He shows enormous 
sensitivity to the role of agency in deciding strategically how to place and define the 
geography of particular struggles. This is an “open” form of Marxism which Smith keenly 
promoted, especially in more recent work. 
 
Smith reasserted the spatial but did not pay as much attention to the temporal as a co-
element of uneven development. But, space and time, as  Harvey shows, are inseparable, 
leading him to fashion the term spatio-temporal scales (Harvey 1996:353): 
 
The relational view of space holds there is no such thing as space outside of the 
processes that define it. This very formulation implies that, as in the case of relative space, 
it is impossible to disentangle space from time. We must therefore focus on the relationality 
of space-time rather than of space in isolation. 
 
Here the idea of spatial unevenness has been combined with temporal unevenness in a 
fashion developed by Trotsky. Smith’s central work on scale has significant implications 
for political strategy and for socialist internationalism. But there is a danger of a one-sided 
focus on equalisation and differentiation as separate dynamics, and consequently a neglect of 
the ways in different parts and scales of the globe are related, connected to form an organic 
whole. The crucial political point is that similarity cannot be a foundation for class politics 
within a highly differentiated global working class, with each national working class facing 
distinct contexts. 
 
Smith and Harvey spent years arguing for a dialectical, relational method. Applied to the 
world, their focus has been the relatedness of parts and the ways in which parts and scales 
are determined by the whole and do not exist as original entities. Harvey (1996:290), for 
example, argues that without seeing relations between places, identities and processes 
we run the risk of worshipping the condition that produced difference. “Discovering the 
nature of [such] connections and learning to translate politically between them is a problem 
for detailed research”. For Harvey, like Trotsky, historical time and periods are 
compressed under capitalism—a mode of production ceaselessly “searching out new 
organisational forms, new technologies, new lifestyles…” (Harvey 1996:240). Where Trotsky 
explored the wider socio-political strategic implication of time–space compressions for 
working-class power (struggles for democracy and socialism), using the terms “uneven 
and combined development”, Harvey’s focus remains largely on cultural and populist 




There is enormous relevance, as we write, to a South Africa today terribly divided by 
xenophobia by the poorer sections of the working class, themselves facing persistent 
unemployment of more than a third of the working-age population. 
 
Smith’s mentor, Harvey, goes on to argue for an epistemology that permits a deeper 
understanding of the distinction between the “significant” and “insignificant othernesses” 
(Harvey 1996:363). Harvey believes that the “mere pursuit of identity as an end in itself” 
that is focusing single-mindedly on difference does not help to overcome the conditions that 
produce difference in the first place. Here it is to a “critical re-engagement with political 
economy” that we must turn to discover how commodities, money, market exchange and 
capital accumulation creates a shared and interdependent world (Harvey 1996:360). 
However, such a view would need to take into account the multiple institutional and scalar 
fragmentations of the working class, blacks, women, nationalities—in short political forms of 
uneven and combined development that make us different. The approach adopted by 
Chandra Mohanty (2003:226) on third world feminism, like Harvey, emphasises that in: 
 
knowing differences and particularities we can better see the connections and commonalities 
because no boundary is ever complete or rigidly determining … Specifying difference 
allows us to theorise universal concerns more fully … it is this intellectual move that allows 
for women of different identities to build coalitions and solidarities. 
 
Iris Marion Young (2011) in her classic discussion of difference and multiculturalism 
argues for “differentiated solidarity” where difference not sameness of experience became 
the lodestone of universality/internationalism/solidarity. Yet we cannot fetishise difference 
since both sameness and difference have to be explored not theoretically but in practical 
ways of knowing. 
 
As already noted, the common conceptual error—the mistaken search for only sameness of 
class experience as the basis of social solidarity—has significant strategic implications. The 
basis of class solidarity, however, may not be mechanical sameness but interdependency and 
mutual understanding of particularities and context. These interdependencies are best 
approached through the prism of uneven and combined development. 
 
Theories of uneven development fall apart when they presume that the particularity of 
each country or region is merely of supplementary significance and simply needs to be 
seen as an added factor to be taken into account when thinking about progressive politics. 
This is much like those for whom national, racial or gender oppressions are mere residual 
factors that deserve airtime after more primary class oppression. In this respect, it is 
instructive to revisit the Trotsky–Stalin debate on uneven development and to indicate why 
the combined aspect is so crucial. Stalin argued that: 
 
the foundation of the activities of every Communist party … must be the general features of 




It is precisely on this that the internationalism rests. The specific features are merely 
supplementary to the general features. 
 
Trotsky (2005:126), in contrast, argued that: 
 
it is false that world economy is simply a sum of national parts of one and the same type. It is 
false that the specific features are “merely supplementary to the general features”, like warts 
on a face. In reality, the national peculiarities represent an original combination of the basic 
features of the world process. This originality can be of decisive significance for revolutionary 
strategy over a span of many years … it is absolutely wrong to base the activity of the 
Communist parties on some “general features”, that is, on an abstract type of national 
capitalism … National capitalism cannot be even understood, let alone reconstructed, 
except as a part of world economy. 
 
South Africa’s Politics of Scale 
Smith’s ideas navigate a number of difficult terrains we trek on today when 
confronting race, class and space in “post-apartheid” South Africa. For South Africa 
even after official apartheid was abolished in 1994–1995 still actively produces 
racialised inequality through new mechanisms as well as durable systems such as migrant 
labour. South African “national capital” has, especially since 1999, rapidly globalised both 
by shifting financial headquarters to London and expanding into the rest of Africa through 
mining, construction, supermarkets and shopping malls, banking, weapons commerce, 
tourism, cellphones and other services. 
 
At the same time, millions of economically desperate refugees and migrant workers 
from the continent have come to South Africa, mostly illegally under desperate 
conditions, often because of extreme political stresses in at home. They have taken up 
precarious non-unionised jobs at low pay, jammed male migrants into scarce urban 
housing (hence raising rental rates), and outcompeted local household-scale retailers 
(“spaza shops”) because they combine resources and buy in bulk. In each such case, the 
immigrants have generated tensions with South African residents and workers over 
production and reproduction that have had tragic results, as violent xenophobia regularly 
pulses through South African working-class townships. Scores of deaths and hundreds of 
attacks on foreign blacks have torn apart solidaristic politics. 
 
The alliance between the African National Congress (ANC) and Congress of South African 
Trade Unions (COSATU) also began to fray after 2009 when anticipated changes in 
economic policy—away from post-apartheid neoliberalism—failed to materialise. The 2012 
massacre of 34 platinum mineworkers at Lonmin’s Marikana mine was a gory reflection of 
the ANC’s obedience to multinational capital. In late 2013, the biggest trade union in 
Africa (the National Union of Metalworkers) withdrew support for the ANC and called for  
an  independent  working  class party based on the united front tactic. The rise of a left 
parliamentary force—the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) won more than a million 




ferment. There are new possibilities for combining this deep unhappiness with the failed 
nationalist project so as to address deep-rooted problems of inequality, regional 
chauvinism, localism and a divided labour movement,  ultimately leading to a regional 
socialist movement. 
 
But to learn these lessons requires a brief overview of 1970s debates. In apartheid South Africa, 
the key political debates on the Left were framed around the primacy of race or class, leading 
to a split between those who wanted to build a class-conscious socialist orientated 
movement centred on the massive South African black proletariat, versus those who wanted a 
broad alliance of all classes opposed to racial domination. The scalar debates have been 
intense as workerists saw the factory as the key site for developing a class consciousness, 
uncontaminated by petit-bourgeois community/nationalist politics. The contest over 
strategies—a two-stage versus a socialist revolution—was the dominant theme. For the 
“populists” the democratic/national/community issues would be solved by the nationalist 
movement with strong support from the working class, but based on building a black 
bourgeoisie. As ANC intellectual and later president Thabo Mbeki insisted in 1984: “The 
ANC is not a socialist party. It has never pretended to be one, it has never said it was, and 
it is not trying to be” (Mbeki 1984:609). 
 
The ANC-UDF tradition came head to head with workerism in the late 1970s and was able to 
decisively defeat the workerist/socialist impulse. But this divide has fundamentally 
resurfaced and shaped the debates even after the Marikana massacre, the breakup of 
COSATU after 2014, and the rise of EFF. However, what makes these dramatic shifts difficult 
to sustain is something Smith would quickly recognise: increased tensions between places 
(e.g. provinces and cities competing for investment, tourists, skilled labour, universities, etc.). 
For example, xenophobia against African foreign workers and migrants and fear of 
internal migrants are important aspects of South Africa’s scalar politics and urbanisation. 
At the urban scale we also see gated communities: mini-suburbs of mainly rich whites that 
act as separate mini-states  protected  by private armies  of men employed by mostly foreign 
companies which have more fire power than the police (Ashman et al. 2010; Lemanski 
2004; Miraftab 2007). Drawing on seminal work by Smith, scholars have documented the 
rise of revanchism (see Smith 1998) in  South  African cities whose managers have declared a 
low-level war on the poor and the homeless in the city. 
 
Provinces receiving internal migrant labour seek to blame various problems on the donor 
province. The Western Cape government, for example, has sought compensation from 
the central government for the inflow  of  low-income black Eastern Cape migrants, 
whom the provincial governor—an upper-class white—controversially termed “refugees”. 
This provincial chauvinism shows how militant particularism in the name of job creation 
and better services can have devastating results and feed into larger social tendencies such 
as xenophobia. In the Western Cape, coloured workers vote for the neoliberal party (the 






Since 1994 when South African corporations started to dramatically increase investments 
in the rest of Africa, millions of refugees from other African countries have come the other 
way. By 2014 about one third of all South African exports went to African buyers and about 
12% of company profits came from African operations. Not only economic but also cultural 
expansion (mostly of the downward sort) has happened as SA exports its racism, bad 
television shows, malls and taxis to the continent. Yet African immigrants have faced bleak 
prospects in assimilating into South African society, not least because of the extremely high 
unemployment rate. Their critics (and competitors) are mainly lower-income black South 
Africans. Other (white) immigrants from other continents such as Europe have not 
encountered such problems. 
 
Yet with South African capital moving north, South African trade unions have seen 
opportunities to build external links of solidarity. Many social movements also have begun to 
operate continently. The leading voice of South African labour, Zwelinzima Vavi, made the 
suggestion in a 2014 speech that: 
 
[f]or African trade unions the most important principles to defend are continent-wide 
minimum standards of workers’ rights: to form and join unions, to have the same labour 
protection under the law, and the same minimum wages and conditions, regardless of 
national origin. 
 
As Smith would have explained, the first premise of progressive working-class politics 
must be overcoming localism, racism and chauvinism within the class, and ensuring its 
organisational and physical survival. Nik Heynen et al. (2011) provide a trenchant account 
of Smith’s dialectics of survival and political possibility. The politics of scale, or scale jumping 
as Heynen et al. (2011:242) suggest, is “how we can think about people’s ability to organise 
against the exploitative ramifications of capitalism in important ways not previously 
theorised within political economic theory”. 
 
All this must be understood in the context of the region’s “racial capitalism”: a durable 
white ruling business class aided by a tiny comprador elite, racially segmented working 
class, migrant labour and enduring apartheid spatial legacy. The specificity of South 
African capitalism makes it exceptionally volatile and imparts a special responsibility to 
working-class leadership, given the tendency for reactionary working-class and poor 
people’s organisations (including the ANC on various occasions) to blame foreigners for 
stealing their jobs, occupying their housing or undercutting their township spaza shops 
through predatory pricing. 
 
The specificity of South African capitalism and its deepening African connectedness 
immediately give the events now unfolding a larger scalar character, and help introduce the 
possibility for a continental socialist politics. As the most advanced proletariat in Africa, 
South African workers have a special role to play continentally. To paraphrase Trotsky, this 
does not mean Nigerian or Algerian workers must await the signal from the large organised 




the South Africa to free them. On the contrary, “workers must develop the revolutionary 
struggle in every country, where favourable conditions have been established, and through 
this set an example for the workers of other countries”. 
 
In the early 1970s the Mozambique revolution led by Samora Machel became the signal for the 
South African revolution and the Black Consciousness movement as well as the 1976 
uprising. Zimbabwe’s struggles similarly inspired South Africans. Simultaneously, 
leadership in small towns such as Cradock—guided by Matthew Goniwe during the 1980s—
became beacons for the South Africa freedom struggle (Ruiters 2011). Uneven development 
leaves open many surprises. A bold approach is needed that includes decisive efforts to 
organise foreign workers in South Africa (legal or not) into unions and into social 
movements (Hlatshwayo 2013:243–246). 
 
Conclusion 
Smith’s conceptual apparatus addresses a basic error of revolutionary politics, one which has 
significant strategic implications, namely the mistaken search for universality or mechanical 
sameness of class experience as the basis of political solidarity. Smith’s reformulation of 
uneven and combined development and his politics of scale and place (nested scales from 
the body to the global) together assist us in understanding specific social formations (class, 
race and gender and place) and particularities at different geographical scales, as well as the 
particularities of concrete politics, especially following from his classic work on the 
“conquest of scale”. Like Harvey, Smith emphasises a dialectic of the social and spatial—a 
politics of place—and of scalar identities that need to be both affirming and transcendent. 
The working class, after all, must both constitute itself nationally as the 
dominant/hegemonic class and abolish itself as a national class through internationalism,  
while  finally  liquidating  itself  in  a  new  classless  global  society.  These challenges, we 
shall suggest, are best approached through the prism of uneven and combined 
development—an approach that allows for paradoxes rather than simplifications. 
 
The crux of class solidarity lies not in sameness but interdependencies. The prism of uneven 
and combined development provides powerful ways to think about interconnectedness. 
The political and material basis of class solidarity implodes when it is assumed that the 
particularity of each country or region is simply of additional importance and merely 
should be factored into progressive politics. Racism, gender and oppressions are not 
secondary features or by-products of class as the mechanical base-superstructure method 
would have it. 
 
As old ideological and historical allegiances to the ANC melt away aided by the icy hand of 
neoliberalism, new solidarities develop among the working class (including the poor, the 
youth, women and unemployed). Uneven development of class awareness and internal 
divisions plays out across various terrains: casuals versus permanents, skilled versus 
unskilled, those in large versus small firms, local versus foreign workers and so on. The 
uneven development of the working class (both its objective and subjective dimensions) 




United Front politics inaugurated by the National Union of Metalworkers and anti-
government union allies could yet become a national and regional beacon for up-scaling 
struggles. 
 
One crucial test of this new, unifying politics within t h e  c o n j u n c t u r e  o f  South Africa 
in 2016 is the way xenophobia is addressed. Smith’s critique of segregatory unevenness 
within the urban process is of enormous importance to a new internationalist activism. The 
challenge will be a scale-jump of activists of the working class (not middle-class moralisers): 
from the shack settlements, inner cities, migrant labour hostels and smaller villages where 
attacks on African and South Asian immigrants are recorded, to the sub-regional and 
continental sites of struggle against artificial borders carved in 1885 in a Berlin conference 
hall. 
 
Those borders are, in turn, reflective of the geopolitical balance of  forces during the 
prevailing global overaccumulation crisis, in which centralised finance set the context for 
the Scramble for Africa back in 1885, cementing in so many colonial political-economic 
processes that divide Africans today. For a long time progressive left internationalists will 
continue to look to Smith for insights into why unevenness born of that process is still 
the defining territorial expression of capital. With his sensitivity to the nuances of 
revolutionary politics, it is Smith’s critique of the myriad socio-political, ecological and 
economic features of uneven and combined development that we can return to, in search 
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